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  Abstract:  Although the executive branch appoints Japanese Supreme Court justices as it 
does in the United States, a personnel office under the control of the Supreme Court rotates lower 
court Japanese judges through a variety of posts.  This creates the possibility that politicians might 
indirectly use the postings to reward or punish judges.  For forty years, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) controlled the legislature and appointed the Supreme Court justices who in turn 
controlled the careers of these lower-court judges.  In 1993, it temporarily lost control.  We use 
regression analysis to examine whether the end of the LDP’s electoral lock changed the court’s 
promotion system, and find surprisingly little change.  Whether before or after 1993, the Supreme 
Court used the personnel office to "manage" the careers of lower court judges.  The result:  
uniform and predictable judgments that economize on litigation costs by facilitating out-of-court 
settlements. 
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  The Chief Justice of the United States supervises a vast judicial bureaucracy.  He 
is the titular head of the Judicial Branch:  1200 judges with life tenure, plus 850 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges and 30,000 administrative staff members.  The careers 
he can affect most are those of his administrative employees.  Even the life-tenured 
judges, however, he can appoint to specialized judicial bodies.  In doing all this, he 
supervises the federal Judicial Conference with its budget of $5.4 billion.
1   
  If the Chief Justice of the U.S. does much, his counterpart in Japan does much 
more.  Not only does he supervise the administrative employees, he also supervises the 
judicial personnel office called the Secretariat.  In turn, the judges in the Secretariat 
control the jobs of the 3,000 other national judges who decide cases (there are no 
prefectural judges, analogous to state judges in the United States).  The American Chief 
Justice does not tell lower court judges where to sit (though see Section III, below).  
Through the Secretariat, the Japanese Chief Justice does.  The American Chief Justice 
does not decide how much the lower court judges earn.  Through the Secretariat, the 
Japanese Chief Justice does.  Effectively, the Chief Justice exercises power over the 
career of every lower court judge.  All this he does as an appointee of a distinctly political 
Prime Minister.   
  This is not an institutional structure likely to foster judicial independence.  Nor 
over the four decades that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ran Japan did the party 
care to foster independence.  Instead, the Chief Justices supervised the courts in ways that 
furthered the electoral interests of the LDP.  Over time, litigants allied with opposition 
parties filed a variety of politically sensitive legal challenges.  When a judge decided one 
of their cases along the lines the opposition wanted, he tended to suffer in his career.  
  The LDP temporarily lost power in 1993, and politicians from other parties took 
control.  Although the LDP reclaimed the government in 1996, it had lost its electoral 
lock, and now needed to consider the possibility that it might again find itself in the 
opposition.  Throughout the ensuing instability, however, the courts retained their tightly 
controlled, conservative structure.  Smarter and harder working judges did better than the 
(relatively) dull and indolent.  Those who served as loyal “organization men” did better 
than renegades who had allied themselves with the left.   
  Whether in Japan or in the U.S., university professors and bar activists express 
dismay at court systems so susceptible to control from the top.  Yet their dismay misses 
much of the point.  In Japan, these incentives place judges within a brutally competitive 
internal labor market.  Through the resulting incentives, the Chief Justice effectively 
imposes on the judges stringently uniform standards.  That uniformity, in turn, enables 
disputants to settle their disputes out of court by the expected litigated outcome.   
  Through its system of “managed judges,” in other words, Japan has created a 
system that lets people resolve their disputes by looking to uniform and predictable legal 
standards.  The standards remain uniform and predictable because the judges who impose 
them have far more incentive   than American judges to keep them that way.  The 
predictability creates less need for lawyers to discover and argue the law.  In turn, it lets 
                     
1 Judith Resnik & Theodore Ruger, One Robe, Two Hats -- A Commentary, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2005; 
Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 341,343, 358-67 
(2004). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 3 
Japanese taxpayers use law and courts with far fewer lawyers than taxpayers in the 
United States.  In short,   Japan has used these incentives to  slash  the transactions costs 
that American lawyers, juries, and judges magnify so remorselessly.   
  The political costs to Japan of having “managed judges” are trivial.  The vast 
majority of cases involve no issues of political moment.  Whether in Japan or the U.S., 
most legal disputes instead concern such things as traffic accidents and debt collection.  
What is more, the LDP was before 1993 the majority party anyway.  Even in those rare 
political cases when judges furthered LDP electoral interests, usually they just gave 
Japanese voters what they wanted from their government.  
  In this article, we detail the structure of the Japanese courts and use statistical 
analysis to see if the promotion structure changed after the LDP lost power in 1993.  We 
start by laying out the institutional structure and explaining where political influence 
entered and did not enter before 1993 (Section I.A.).  We then describe the events of 
1993 and how they might have affected the behavior of the courts (I.B.).  After doing so, 
we look quantitatively at both the Supreme Court and the lower courts to see what 
actually happened (I.C.).  We conclude with a summary and fuller discussion  -- 
necessarily more speculative than the rest of the paper  -- of the advantages and 
disadvantages of this system of managed judges (II.).   
 
I.  Structure and Implementation 
A.  The Pre-1993 Tradition:
2 
  1.  Institutional structure. -- (a) The Secretariat.  At the apex of the Japanese 
courts stands the Chief Justice of the fifteen-member Supreme Court.  Appointed by the 
Prime Minister, he participates in judicial decision-making.  He presides over the Judicial 
Conference, the justices of the Supreme Court meeting on matters of rulemaking and 
judicial administration.  And he runs the court’s administrative office, the Secretariat.   
  In running the Secretariat, the Chief Justice runs an institution he knows well, 
especially compared to most of his fellow justices.  From 1973 to 2003, a plurality of the 
82 Supreme Court appointees had been career judges before joining the Court, but a 
majority had not.  During the same period, every Chief Justice had been a career lower-
court judge.  Of the five Chief Justices appointed since 1983 (we lack career data on the 
earlier Justices), each had worked in the Secretariat himself while a lower-court judge.  
Three of the five had even headed it as the Secretary General (see Tables 1 and 2).  If we 
look beyond just the Chief Justice to all 20 post-1983 justices appointed from the lower 
courts, we find 7 who had earlier served as Secretary General of the Secretariat, and 
                     
2 We base this discussion on our earlier work.  That work began with a series of articles:  J. Mark Ramseyer 
& Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges so Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 
331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate so High?, 30 J. Legal Stud. 
53 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Skewed Incentives:  Paying for Politics as a Japanese Judge, 
Judicature, 190 (Jan.-Feb. 2000); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 
72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 571 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime:  
The Evidence from Japan, 13 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 259 (1997).  We then collected this material into a book:  J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B.  Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence:  The Political Economy of Judging in Japan 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2003).  Our citations to Ramseyer & Rasmusen, below, refer to this book. Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 4 
another 9 had worked there in other capacities.   Only 4 had never worked in the 
Secretariat.
3   
  Justices appointed from positions outside the court system would, of course, lack 
such experience and therefore have less power over the careers of lower-court judges. 
These include university professors, prosecutors, lawyers in private practice, and 12 
bureaucrats.  Of the last group, five had headed the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, five were 
former diplomats, and one each came from the ministries of labor and of health and 
welfare.
4 
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
  Like other Supreme Court justices, the Chief Justice serves until mandatory 
retirement at age 70.  In theory, voters can recall him and his Supreme Court colleagues 
at a general parliamentary election.  In practice, they do not, and have never even come 
close.  The justices' jobs are secure.
5  
  Not so the jobs of lower court judges.  To a Japanese judge the Secretariat 
represents what the Vatican is to an ambitious Catholic priest:  the ultimate locus of 
control over their careers.  Japanese judges join the court young.  Rather than being 
appointed in mid-career as in the U.S., they join right after completing their legal training 
at the national law school, the Legal Research & Training Institute (LRTI).  Because for 
years the Institute entrance exam had a 1-3 percent pass rate (it is higher today), most 
judges flunked it several times before starting the LRTI (Table 3, Panel D.).  As a result, 
by the time they joined the court most were in their late 20s.   
  [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
  Lower-court judges serve a series of 10-year terms.  Although the Secretariat can 
choose not to reappoint them at the end of each term, it almost invariably does.  Judges 
face mandatory retirement at age 65, but most retire at about 60.
6   
  Judges sit where the Secretariat tells them to sit.  Ostensibly to train the young 
judges, to avoid corruption, and to equalize the quality of provincial courts, the 
Secretariat moves judges from post to post at regular intervals, typically of three years.  
These moves can be and often are from one end of Japan to the other, and from trial 
courts to appellate courts and back again.  The Secretariat also decides their pay via 
promotions.  Although the Constitution does protect judges against pay cuts, it does not 
promise them pay raises.  Judicial salaries range widely, and the Secretariat decides how 
fast they climb the scale.
7 
                     
3 Here and elsewhere, we obtain our data on the Japanese judiciary from Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, ed., 
Zen saibankan keireki soran dai 4 ban [Overview of Careers of All Japanese Judges, 4th ed.] (Tokyo:  Konin sha, 
2004).   
4 John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary:  Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in Daniel 
Foote, ed., Law in Japan:  A Turning Point? (Seattle:  University of Washington Press:  forthcoming 2007), at 9. 
5 Saibansho ho [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, Sec. 50 (retirement age); J. Mark Ramseyer & Frances 
McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, Rev. ed. 152-53 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1997) 
(recalls). 
6 Courts Act, supra note, at Sec. 50 (mandatory retirement age); Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, supra note, at 154 
(retirement practice), 156 & 165 (non-reappointment incidents). 
7 Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, supra note, at 155 (pay scale); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note, at 40-43 
(determinants of pay). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 5 
  The Supreme Court also differs from lower courts in how readily the heterodox 
can express their views.  By law, each Supreme Court justice must give his own opinion 
in a Supreme Court case.
8  Hence, published cases include dissenting opinions as well as 
majority opinions and dissenting votes.  In the lower courts, dissenting judges on a panel 
do not publish separate opinions.  They cannot try to express their views and modify the 
law by the eloquent presentation of their arguments.  
 
  (b) The hierarchy of posts.  Not all posts are created equal.  Usually, a judge 
wants a job in one of the major metropolitan areas, and in Tokyo if possible.  American 
visitors may delight in the mountain towns and seaside villages of the Japanese 
countryside, but ambitious Japanese professionals stick to Tokyo.  Tokyo houses the 
national government.  It houses the Supreme Court and the Secretariat.  It represents the 
locus of the opposition parties.  It contains most of the professional, civic, and non-profit 
organizations.  It houses the headquarters of most large corporations.  It is the site of the 
best universities.  And crucially for professionals with families, it has most of the best 
preparatory schools.   
  Judges also want judgeships with administrative power.  After about 22 years, 
they can expect a “sokatsu” posting -- a judgeship with personnel responsibilities over 
their local court.
9  Before retiring, some can expect to serve as a District Court Chief 
Judge.  And the most successful will become Chief Judge of one of the seven High 
Courts (the appellate courts).
10   
  Most judges covet certain non-judicial jobs as well.  Perhaps the most prestigious 
such posting is to the Secretariat itself.  There, a judge may handle personnel rotations, 
set court policy, or write rough drafts of Supreme Court opinions.  Other judges may 
work at a prosecutorial office.  They may teach future lawyers and judges at the LRTI.  
Or they might spend a few years at the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. 
  The same ambitious  judges will shun the family courts, summary courts, and 
judicial branch offices when they can.  Branch offices tend to be in the smaller cities, and 
have only one or a very few judges.  Even promising judges will spend some time in a 
branch office, but fast-track judges will have fewer such rotations than others.  Summary 
courts (i.e., small claims courts) represent a separate structure entirely, and most 
summary court judges are not part of the judicial hierarchy at all.  Still, a standard judge 
on a slow track can occasionally find himself exiled to summary court duty for several 
years.   
  Reflecting the prestige of Tokyo posts, the Secretariat every year chooses from its 
new recruits the most promising and names them to the Tokyo District Court (TDC; see 
Table 3, Pan. E).  Typically, that appointment places the judge on a fast track.  Should he 
work shrewdly and prudently, he will earn more rotations through prestigious posts (and 
fewer in branch offices) than his colleagues for the rest of his career.  The Secretariat also 
determines which new judges are least promising, and until recently (but no longer) 
named them to an initial appointment at a branch office or summary court (Table 3, Pan. 
F). 
                     
8 Courts Act, supra note, at Sec. 11. 
9 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note, at 40 (years to sokatsu). 
10 Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, supra note, at 166 (highest career jobs). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 6 
  Take the career of a fairly successful judge, Keiichi Konagamitsu.  A native of the 
southern provincial city of Fukuoka, Konagamitsu attended the prestigious University of 
Kyoto, typically ranked second only to the University of Tokyo (see Table 3, Pans. B and 
C).  He graduated from the LRTI in 1965, and went to work at the District Court in the 
urban center of Okayama.  Given that he was born in 1936, he probably graduated from 
the university in 1958.  Since he entered the LRTI in 1963, he apparently failed the LRTI 
entrance exam five times (compare Table 3, Pan. D). 
  Konagamitsu's first rotation after his three years in Okayama took him to the 
TDC.  Another three years there, and he went to provincial Niigata.  After yet another 
three years, he returned to Tokyo, and four years later (at age 42) moved to his home of 
Fukuoka.  Other than a few years teaching at the Tokyo-based LRTI, he spent most of the 
rest of his career in Fukuoka.  After serving as Chief Judge of the Fukuoka District Court 
for 18 months, he retired in 2001 at age 65.   
  Over this elaborate hierarchy presides the Chief Justice.  He supervises the 
Secretary General of the Secretariat.  The Secretary General is himself on a fast track, 
and may join the Supreme Court within a few years.  He supervises the judges staffing 
the Secretariat, and those Secretariat judges monitor the performance of the rest.  They 
decide who will move where at the end of each three-year stint and how quickly to 
promote each judge on the pay scale. 
 
  2.  Implementation.
11 -- During most of the post-War years, the Secretariat moved 
judges neither uniformly nor randomly.  Instead, it promoted the talented more quickly 
than the dull, and the industrious more quickly than the indolent (if we may use such 
terms comparatively -- all who pass the LRTI examination form an elite group).  Through 
a series of empirical studies using multivariate regressions, we examined the gist of this 
system as it operated through the late 1980s.  Here is what we found.  
  First, the Secretariat favored judges from the most selective universities.  Because 
these schools maintain the most selective entrance examinations, their graduates tend to 
be smarter and harder working than others.  Not surprisingly, then, judges from these 
schools tend to obtain the best jobs at the outset, to obtain better posts over the course of 
their careers, and to climb the pay scale most rapidly. 
  Second, the Secretariat favored the judges who passed the entrance examination 
to the LRTI most quickly.  Within the contemporary bar, students who pass the exam on 
one of their first tries obtain the coveted jobs at the highest-paying law firms.  Within the 
courts, we found that those who passed it early landed the best initial posts, obtained the 
more prestigious jobs over the next several decades, and climbed the pay scale most 
quickly. 
                     
11 The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 below is based on Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note.  This empirical 
work generated two spirited responses from John Haley:  John O. Haley, Review, 30 Journal of Japanese Studies 235 
(2004); Haley, supra note; see also John O. Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 Law in Japan 1 (1995).  
Frank Upham’s summary and critique of the exchange appears in Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public 
Servants:  Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, __ Law & Social Inquiry 421 (2005). 
As we understand Haley’s views, he does not contest our description of the institutional framework, does not 
contest the way that the Secretariat has enforced it in the apolitical context, and does not object to our characterization 
of the outcome of most politically sensitive cases as pro-LDP.  Instead, he objects to our use of principal-agent theory 
to attribute that pro-LDP bias to LDP politicians.  He emphasizes their lack of overt intervention, and the institutional 
freedom of the Supreme Court to control the lower courts as it wished.  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 7 
  Third, judges who did well early in their careers tended to do well later.  Even if 
we control for other measures of performance, those judges posted initially to the TDC 
continued to obtain better than average posts throughout their career.  They obtained pay 
raises more quickly as well. 
  Fourth, although the evidence is more haphazard, the judges who published the 
most opinions tended to obtain better jobs.  And last, men seem to have climbed the pay 
scale more quickly than women. 
 
  3.  Political bias. -- This institutional structure creates an obvious potential for 
political bias.  The Prime Minister appoints the Chief Justice.  The Chief Justice 
supervises the Secretary General, the Secretary General runs the Secretariat, and the 
Secretariat decides which judges obtain the best jobs and quickest raises.  By appointing 
as Chief Justice men who shared his preferences, the Prime Minister could inject a 
political bias into the administration of the courts.  Given mandatory retirement of 
justices at age 70, he might not have long to wait.  As Table 2 shows, Prime Minister 
Koizumi was able to appoint eight members of the Supreme Court, a majority, within two 
years of taking office.  
  By basic principal-agent theory, whether the Prime Minister overtly intervened in 
the courts is beside the point.  The stereotypical English lord did not need to remind a 
good butler what he wanted done.  Good butlers knew what their masters wanted and did 
it before the master asked.  Indeed, the master only cared about results, and was glad to 
delegate details to the butler.  To be sure, if a Prime Minister never intervened in the 
courts, that fact could indicate that he lacked the power to do so.  Yet in Japan the 
institutional structure gave him full power to choose a Chief Justice who would enforce 
his political preferences on the courts.  If he never intervened, that lack of intervention 
more likely indicates that his appointees in the courts knew what he wanted done, and did 
it without his needing to ask. 
  Granted, the Prime Minister’s power over the courts was indirect and slow.  His 
was the power to appoint, not the power to fire.  In turn, the Chief Justice’s power was 
the power to promote or withhold promotion, not the power to punish a wayward judge 
immediately.  The LDP had long controlled the Parliament, and expected to continue to 
control it.  Ultimately, indirect power was apparently enough:  overwhelmingly, the 
courts did promote the electoral interests of the LDP.   
  The leaders of the LDP were not ideologues trying to leave a legacy of social 
change and progressive legislation.  They were politicians who wanted to please voters 
and the business community, and a majority of voters and businesses wanted steady and 
continuing economic growth.  Toward that end, LDP leaders did not want courts that 
tried to change society -- if they wanted a new legal rule, as leaders of the majority party 
they could implement a change through a statute.  They wanted courts that would 
administer the law efficiently and stay out of the way.  And, of course, staying out of the 
way included staying out of the way of government policies, rather than introducing 
awkward questions of constitutionality. 
  Thus, the LDP wanted two things from the courts:  for judges to keep their 
political views out of their opinions, and to refrain from invoking the Constitution when 
doing so would offend the LDP.  These considerations suggest that Japanese courts may 
not always have been politically neutral on questions of constitutionality.  To test that Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 8 
neutrality before 1993, we examined a series of politically charged disputes.  Again using 
multivariate regressions, we consistently found that those lower-court judges who 
decided the cases in the way that LDP leaders wanted tended to obtain better jobs in the 
decade after the decision than those judges who flouted those preferences. 
  We also examined the careers of the several hundred judges who, in the 1960s, 
joined the left-leaning Young Jurists League (YJL).
12  Judges who joined the League 
tended to suffer in their careers.  All else equal, they obtained less attractive positions 
than their peers.  Concomittantly, they earned pay raises more slowly than those peers. 
 
B.  Potential Change: 
1.  The chaos of 1993. -- Nineteen ninety three was a bad year for the LDP.  After 
dominating politics for nearly four decades, it entered the 1990’s facing a massive range 
of problems.  Having championed enormously expensive public-works projects for years, 
it had in 1988 imposed a national sales tax that alienated a broad range of voters.  Under 
pressure from the U.S., it instituted trade and investment reforms that threatened key 
party constituents.  With the end of the Cold War, its broadly capitalist constituency 
began to unravel.  As rural Japanese continued to migrate to the cities, its agricultural 
base steadily atrophied.  Bribery scandals discredited several of its key leaders.  And the 
economy -- after booming for years -- spiralled into recession.   
Within this crisis, old enemies within the party decided to settle scores.  Ichiro 
Ozawa, once a leading Prime Minister candidate, engineered a no-confidence vote, quit 
the LDP, and created a new party around his faction.  In the ensuing election, every 
member in his faction won re-election, but the LDP captured only a minority of seats.  
Several non-LDP parties then regrouped.  They coalesced around Ozawa and renegade-
LDP politician Morihiro Hosokawa, and threw the LDP out of power.  Yet Hosokawa 
could not break free of Ozawa's influence, and the coalition that had thrust him into 
power soon unraveled.  He himself governed only eight months, and his successor 
(another ex-LDP politician) lasted barely two.   
Maneuvering through the chaos, the Socialists struck a deal with the LDP that 
catapulted their own leader, Tomiichi Murayama into the Prime Minister's office.  It was 
their first return to power since Tetsu Katayama’s short-lived Socialist government in 
1947.  It was a return that did not last.  Like Hosokawa, Murayama suffered under 
behind-the-scenes control by experienced LDP politicians.  He implemented little if any 
of the traditional Socialist agenda, and his party lost its credibility.  In the 1996 election 
the LDP regained sole control of the government.  Usually in coalition with smaller 
parties, it has held the Cabinet ever  since.
13  
 
  2.  The potential for change. -- Although the LDP eventually returned to power, it 
now faced a far more uncertain future.  In the days before 1993, LDP leaders had faced 
an opposition fractured into several parties -- most of which lay far to the left of the 
median voter.  Their loss in that year was due to Ozawa’s defection, not to the power of 
                     
12 We obtained the YJL roster from Shiso undo kenkyu sho, ed., Osorubeki saiban [Fearsome Trials] (Tokyo:  
Zenbo sha, 1969). 
13 For a description of the events of 1993, see, e.g., Jacob M. Schlesinger, Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and 
Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gary Cox and Frances McCall 
Rosenbluth, The Anatomy of a Split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan, 14 Electoral Studies 355 (1995). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 9 
the traditional opposition.   After 1996, they faced parties posing a much more serious 
electoral threat, and they would not regain an absolute majority in Parliament until 2005.  
In turn, this forced them to share power with coalition partners, albeit partners small 
enough not to threaten their dominance within the coalitions.   
We closed our previous studies of judicial incentives before the 1993 crisis.  
During its four decades in power, we concluded, the LDP had stacked the Supreme Court 
with men who shared its policy preferences.  These men had supervised the Secretariat, 
and the Secretariat had run a “tight ship.”  Under its control, the courts had operated as a 
smoothly running, hierarchically structured, and internally competitive organization.  
Competing for a finite set of career rewards within this internal labor market, court 
employees (i.e., judges) had worked hard and worked well.  Largely, they had 
adjudicated disputes (a) predictably, (b) expeditiously, and (c) in politically sensitive 
cases, according to the policy preferences of the LDP. 
At the time we began our work on the Japanese courts, too few years had elapsed 
since 1993 for us to measure any change.  Now, however, the LDP has been back in 
power nearly a decade.  How might the courts have changed?  From 1993 to 1994, a 
coalition dominated by former-LDP politicians ran the Cabinet, with but dubious hopes 
of long-term survival.  From 1994 to 1996, a bizarre coalition of the biggest parties of the 
left and the right controlled the Cabinet.  Since 1996, the LDP has returned to power -- 
but to an obviously fragile power.   
These vicissitudes potentially affected the courts along several dimensions.  First, 
where a capitalist party had ruled for decades, now a self-consciously leftist party briefly 
shared that control.  All else held equal, we would expect more leftist personnel 
decisions.  If a liberal Prime Minister replaces a conservative Prime Minister, we would 
expect him to appoint more liberal justices to the Supreme Court.  Over time, we might 
expect the new justices to promote more liberal judges in the lower courts.   
Second, where one party had ruled before 1993, from 1993 to 1996 coalitions ran 
the country.  The presence of coalition governments muddies the potential influence of 
ideology.  The Socialist Murayama may have wanted to shift the courts toward the left, 
but he shared power with the LDP and the LDP held no such preferences.  Unfortunately 
for the empiricist, whether the government would now change the direction of the courts 
depended on the deals the politicians cut, but politicians disclose few such deals. 
Finally, where the ruling party had expected to continue in power indefinitely 
before 1993, after 1993 no coalition or single-party government had such a high degree 
of confidence.  We will next discuss why this matters.   
 
3.  The importance of expected tenure. -- (a) The desire to control.  The politicians 
running Japan since 1993 have lacked any assurance that they can keep power 
indefinitely.  In turn, those fragile prospects have potentially affected both their desire to 
control the courts and their ability to do so.  Politicians stay in power by delivering 
portfolios of policies and programs desired by at least a plurality of voters.  To do so, 
they need agents who will loyally design and implement the policies and programs those 
constituents demand.  Within the executive branch, they appoint bureaucrats to the job.  
Within the judicial branch, they would like to have judges do the same. 
  Politicians need judges who will loyally interpret and enforce the policies and 
programs promised to voters.  Voters do not elect them to appoint judges who do no Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 10 
work.  Neither do they elect them to appoint judges who adjudicate cases without rhyme 
or reason, who take bribes,
14 or who sabotage the very policies and programs for which 
the politicians were elected.   
  To be sure, some voters also have a "taste” for independent courts, though their 
ideal is perhaps independent judges who do just as the voters want.  Yet independent 
judges can by definition do as they please.  They need not follow precedent.  They can 
invalidate programs they do not like.  They need not even work hard.  Even voters with a 
taste for an independent judiciary will not pay an unlimited price for it. 
  Politicians and voters do benefit from independent judges, but they benefit when 
their party is  out of power.  When their rivals control the government, they gain from 
institutions that block their rivals’ ability to deliver the agenda the majority of voters -— 
but, alas, not their people -- want.  Independent judges offer precisely that obstacle.  
Indeed, by strategically interpreting statutes and constitutions, they may even implement 
the policies and programs of the out-of-power politicians.  Politicians who anticipate 
losing power will not necessarily keep courts independent.  Even they may decide that 
the gains to current control outweigh any benefit from extending their influence into 
future years.  But where a party with high odds of staying in office has less incentive to 
keep courts independent, at least a party facing low reelection probabilities might choose 
to insulate judges from itself.   
  Moreover, according to a theory made famous by William Landes and Richard 
Posner, even majority politicians and voters might benefit from independent judges if 
they would otherwise be unable to keep their commitments.
15  Suppose, for example, that 
voters want to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs.  To do so, 
they need to commit to honoring the patents they award rather than invalidating them 
after seeing the high prices the companies charge.  Independent judges help overcome 
this temptation to renege.  If the politicians care enough about the future, they thus may 
want to maintain the independence of those judges who remind them of their 
commitments.  Through such independent judges, in short, they may preserve a 
reputation that makes their commitments valuable.   
 
(b) The ability to control.  A party's ability to stay in power also affects its ability 
to control the courts.  Most straightforwardly, a party that anticipates staying in power 
can afford to appoint a 64-year-old justice when the retirement age is 70.  Because the 
justice faces only six years in office, he will not significantly "grow in office" and change 
his political preferences.  Because the party will still be in office when he retires, it will 
be able to replace him with another "sound" appointee.   
Less obviously, a party with long-term prospects will also be better able to control 
the lower courts.  Rational lower-court judges will know that the party will probably stay 
in office for the foreseeable future.  As a result, they will not expect the political criteria 
for promotion to change over time.  They will not reason that a boldly anti-LDP decision 
will, after an unhappy but short exile to Tottori, earn them a High Court seat when the 
Left comes to power.  Not only will judges working under a party with long-term 
                     
14 By “judicial independence,” we refer to independence from the government, not independence from private 
parties in a case.  We know of no one who would justify judges who take bribes from private parties. 
15 William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. 
Law & Econ. 875 (1975). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 11 
prospects more readily conform, heterodox jurists will tend to self-select out of judicial 
careers.  If they share the political preferences of the opposition, they will instead opt for 
careers in politics, at universities, or in private practice. 
 
  4.  Observable implications. -- What, then, might be the observable implications 
of the crisis of 1993?  Might Hosokawa and Murayama have tried to shift the courts to 
the left?  Might they and the LDP prime ministers who followed them have tried to 
weaken the ability of sitting cabinets to control the courts?  If they tried either approach, 
we would expect to observe: 
 
(i) Younger Supreme Court justices.  Because the pre-1993 LDP could expect to 
stay in power, it appointed  justices near enough to retirement not to 
change their politics while on the bench.  If post-1993 politicians decided 
to extend their influence into the future, they would have appointed 
younger justices. 
 
(ii) More justices from the universities and the bar.  During the long years of LDP 
control, conservatives and the apolitical disproportionately self-selected 
into the bureaucracy and the courts.  Those with tastes to the left instead 
opted for careers in the bar, in business, in politics, and in the universities.  
As a result, non-LDP Prime Ministers who wanted to control the courts 
would disproportionately have named justices from outside the 
bureaucracy and the courts.   
 
(iii) Changed career patterns within the lower courts.  Before 1993, the Secretariat 
ran the courts tightly, and used that control to favor judges who 
implemented LDP preferences in sensitive cases.  If post-1993 politicians 
hoped to use it to implement different policies, they should have promoted 
different judges.  If they hoped instead to reduce a ruling party’s ability to 
manage the courts, they should have weakened Secretariat control more 
generally.  In either case, the courts should exhibit large-scale deviations 
from earlier career patterns. 
 
C.  Judicial Administration Since 1993: 
  1.   Introduction.  -- We divide the period after 1993 into two parts:  the 
interregnum of weak coalition governments from 1993 to 1996, and the LDP cabinets 
from 1996 to the present.  We also divide the courts into two parts:  the Supreme Court, 
subject to quick turnover after 1993 because of the proximity of all the justices to 
retirement, and the lower courts, where judges continued on their slow path to 
advancement under the supervision of the Secretariat.  The direct impact of any changes 
would show up in the Supreme Court.  The indirect impact would show up in the lower 
courts, either at once (out of anticipation of weaker control by a less pro-LDP Chief 
Justice in the future) or more slowly (once a new Chief Justice began supervising the 
Secretariat). 
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  2.  Supreme Court appointees. -- (a) Age.  Because they expect to lose power 
periodically, political parties in the United States name relatively young justices to the 
Supreme Court.  So too did the Socialist Katayama in Japan in the 1940’s.  As Prime 
Minister when the new constitution took effect in 1947, he had the chance to appoint all 
fifteen Supreme Court justices.  Just as one might expect from an American President, he 
appointed a majority of justices under age 60. 
  By contrast, before 1993 the LDP could expect to stay in power indefinitely, and 
had little reason to appoint justices who were young.  LDP leaders could afford to appoint 
the best-qualified candidates, regardless of age.  Indeed, older candidates presented a 
distinct advantage.  Younger justices can change over time and eventually enforce 
political preferences quite different from those of the party that appointed them.  Rather 
than risk ideological drift, the LDP coupled mandatory retirement (at 70) with older 
appointees -- generally about age 64 (Table 1).  
  After 1993, prime ministers continued to appoint Supreme Court justices at about 
age 64.  Nominally independent Hosokawa appointed his four justices at an average age 
of 64.8.  At-least-nominally-Socialist Murayama appointed his five at a mean 62.6.  Since 
returning to power, the LDP has kept the appointment age largely unchanged (Table 2). 
 
  (b) Careers.  If by virtue of its unbroken power the LDP had shaped the courts in 
its image, men like Hosokawa and Murayama might have made a break from the past, 
and  picked their justices from sources other than the courts that the LDP had controlled 
for so many years.  Table 1 superficially suggests such a break from the past.  Earlier 
LDP prime ministers had appointed over 40 percent of their justices from the judiciary.  
Hosokawa and Murayama each chose only one of their justices from the courts, and -- 
significantly -- the man Murayama picked had been a member of the leftist YJL in the 
1960s.
16    
  Curiously, however, Hosokawa and Murayama did not turn to the obvious sources 
for the rest.  They could have found plenty of independents and Socialists in the bar and 
the universities.  Yet Hosokawa picked only one of his four justices from the bar, and 
Murayama picked only two.  Neither chose a law professor.  Instead, Hosokawa picked 
one justice from the Ministry of Justice (a prosecutor) and one from the Ministry of 
Labor, and Murayama picked one from the Ministry of Justice (another prosecutor) and 
one from the diplomatic corps.
17  
  The appearance of a break with the past is deceptive.  Neither Hosokawa nor 
Murayama controlled the Cabinet long, and neither controlled it without coalition 
partners.  Rather than try hard to reshape the courts, they apparently retained the LDP 
                     
16 Masao Fujii.  That YJL members tended to suffer in their careers does not mean they all suffered.  Fujii 
enjoyed a stellar career long before Murayama named him to the Supreme Court.  Fujii joined the courts in 1957 at age 
24.  By the time of the YJL controversy in 1969, he was already in his teaching second stint at the LRTI.  From there, 
he would go the Osaka District Court, the Osaka High Court, the Ministry of Justice Civil Affairs Bureau, the Tokyo 
District Court, and the Tokyo High Court.  In fact, he became Chief Judge of the Osaka High Court (probably the third 
most prestigious post in the lower courts after the Secretary General of the Secretariat and the Chief Judge of the Tokyo 
High Court) 3 months before Murayama took office.  Note that Fujii -- unlike some YJL members -- did promptly 
resign his membership in the organization when the controversy erupted in 1969. 
17 Obviously, the LDP would have exercised at least as much control over the executive branch as over the 
courts.  Japan has a civil service system, but, as with the judges, tasks must be assigned and promotions granted, and 
the elected official at the top of the ministry will choose civil service heads who have done a good job of managing 
their subordinates.   Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 13 
practice of “reserving” each Supreme Court seat for a particular “line.”  Under this 
practice, LDP Prime Ministers had replaced justices from the lower courts with lower 
court judges, former prosecutors with prosecutors, former lawyers with lawyers, and 
others with -- well, “others.”   
  Appointed from the Fukuoka High Court in 1973, Justice Eriguchi illustrates one 
of the “judge”  lines.  When he retired in 1980, the Prime Minister replaced him with 
Justice Terada of the Tokyo High Court.  Terada retired in 1985, and the Prime Minister 
replaced him with Justice Oouchi, again from the Tokyo High Court.  In 1992, he was 
replaced by Justice Miyoshi (Tokyo High Court), and he in turn by Justice Kanaya 
(Tokyo High Court) in 1997.   
  By contrast, Justice Amano, appointed in 1971, had been a Osaka prosecutor.  
Within two days of his retirement in 1978, the Prime Minister named Justice Yokoi of the 
Nagoya prosecutors' office.  Yokoi retired in 1984, and was replaced by Justice 
Nagashima of the same office.  Four years later, he was succeeded by Justice Teika.  
Because Justice Teika had been a lower-court judge, the Amano-Yokoi-Nagashima line 
now became a judicial line.  When Prime Minister Takeshita appointed the next justice 
three months later, however, he named a man from the Tokyo prosecutor's office.  The 
LDP maintained similar "lines" for lawyers, and others for such assorted figures as 
professors, diplomats and bureaucrats.  Hosokawa and Murayama adhered to the custom 
too, apparently deciding that judicial reform was not a high priority for their coalition 
governments.  
 
  3.  The lower courts. -- (a) Introduction.  To see what happened in the lower 
courts, we combine the methodology of our earlier studies with new data on the post-
1993 era.  In these earlier studies, we examined three categories of variables that 
determined judicial careers:  rulings in individual cases that might interest the LDP, 
membership in a leftwing political organization, the YJL, and nonpolitical variables such 
as quality of college degree and the number of times a judge failed the LRTI entrance 
examination.
18  In this study, we focus on the last two categories.
19 
 
  (b) Appointees. -- Since 1993, the Secretariat has continued to appoint annually 
about the same number of new judges it appointed earlier.  Over the years, that number 
has fluctuated between roughly 70 and 110. The 94 new judges of 1998 fit into that  
range comfortably (Table 3, Pan. A).  Although the 1998 judges on average did pass the 
LRTI exam more quickly than their predecessors, that shift just reflects a slight shift in 
the score necessary to pass the exam and not necessarily any change in the quality of the 
                     
18 We estimate this from the age at which a judge entered the LRTI. 
19 As noted earlier, we take the data on judicial careers from Nihon minshu, supra note xxx, the data on YJL 
membership from Shiso undo, supra note xxx, and university affiliation for the class of 1998 from the Gakushikai, 
Kaiinshi meiroku:  Heisei 10 nen yo [Membership Roster:  For 1998 Use] (Tokyo:  Gakushikai, 1997).   
For the regressions below, we augmented the data by adding 17 judges from the classes of 1957 and 1959 to 
the class of 1958 and 24 judges from the classes of 1966 and 1967 to the class of 1968, to increase the number of YJL 
members in the sample. This is an example of “stratified sampling”, a technique commonly used in statistics to increase 
the information content of the data.  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 14 
test-takers.  Where the pass rate had stayed below 2 percent from 1974 to 1984, by 1996 
(the year the Class of 1998 entered the LRTI) it had risen to 2.9.
20   
  The Secretariat did appoint more women in 1998 than in the past.  Where in 
earlier years it had taken one woman for every nine men, by 1998 it accepted one woman 
for every four.  Rather than any shift in Secretariat policy, however, the change probably 
reflects the larger number of women pursuing legal careers (by 2004, 23.5 percent of the 
LRTI class were women).
21   
 
  (c)  Initial postings.  For many years, the Secretariat has identified its most 
promising recruits and named them to the TDC.  In 1968, 33 percent of the Tokyo 
graduates and 55 percent of the Kyoto graduates started at the TDC, but only 7 percent of 
the others.  And in 1978 the Secretariat named 31 percent of the Tokyo and 27 percent of 
the Kyoto graduates to the court, but only 15 percent of the rest.  
  At the same time, the Secretariat sent its least promising young judges to the 
branch offices and summary courts.  In 1968 and 1978, only 1.5% of Tokyo and Kyoto 
graduates started in a branch office or summary court; 9.1% of the graduates of other 
colleges did.  Only 2.4 percent of the judges who flunked the LRTI exam 4 or fewer 
times started at such courts; 23.3 percent of the rest did.  But by 1988, the Secretariat had 
abandoned its policy of starting any judges at branch offices, perhaps having decided that 
the weaker judges had all the more need to learn their trade from numerous and able 
senior colleagues. 
  The simplest way to compare career paths before and after 1993 is to look one by 
one at the various characteristics of LRTI graduates and see how a given characteristic 
relates to success.  That is what Panel A of Table 4 does.  The “pre-1993” column looks 
at the first assignments of judges from the classes of 1958, 1968, 1978, and 1988.  The 
“post-1993” column looks at the first assignments of judges from the class of 1998.  The 
first row tells us that 30 percent of the U. Tokyo graduates started at the TDC before 
1993, but 63 percent did thereafter.  The second row tells us that after 1993 more non-U-
Tokyo graduates started at the TDC too, but that the increase was smaller.  Apparently, 
when the Secretariat decided to increase the number of judges it started at the TDC, it 
looked primarily to its Tokyo alumni for the additional appointees.  
  Judges who flunked the LRTI exam fewer times also had a greater chance of 
starting in TDC (24% if he flunked 4 or fewer times; 10% if he flunked more than 4 
times), but after 1993 more judges started in Tokyo whether they had flunked the test 
seldom or often.  A greater fraction of men than women started in TDC, and here too the 
fraction of both increased over time.  
  [Add Table 4 about here.] 
  Looking thus at probabilities characteristic-by-characteristic is a good way to 
start, but it has two deficiencies.  First, it is hard to know quite what to make of a given 
cluster of 4 numbers  -- male versus female, pre-1993 versus post-1993.  When the 
percentage of both male and female judges starting in Tokyo rises, for example, what are 
we to make of any change in the effect of being male?  Formal statistical tests exist to 
                     
20 See the Ministry of Justice statistics at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17syutu-gou2.html (last 
checked, Oct. 24, 2005). 
21 See the Ministry of Justice statistics at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17ron-soukatu.html (last 
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answer that question, but they cannot address the second deficiency:  when different 
characteristics are correlated with each other, independent comparisons cannot tell us 
which is the true cause of starting in Tokyo.  If U. Tokyo graduates also are less likely to 
have failed the LRTI exam many times,
22 for example, both characteristics may seem to 
result in a higher chance of being posted to TDC, even if only one is truly causal.  
  The regression method used in Panel B of Table 4 solves these problems.  
Statistical regressions separate the effects of correlated potential causes, and generate 
measures of the reliability of the different effects.  Table 4 uses a probit regression, the 
kind appropriate when the dependent variable that we are trying to predict (in this case, 
whether the Secretariat first posts a judge to the TDC) can only take two values -- here 1 
if he starts at the TDC and 0 otherwise.  We take as our data set information on all judges 
hired in 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, and 1998.  We then explore the impact on this posting 
of a judge’s university affiliation (two variables equal to 1 if a judge attended either of 
the top two universities), the number of times he or she failed the LRTI entrance 
examination (Flunks), and his or her sex (Male = 1).   
  To explore whether the class starting in 1998 differs significantly from the other 
classes, we interact these variables with (i.e., multiply these variables by) a dummy 
variable (Cl-98) equal to 1 if a judge is a member of the 1998 class and 0 otherwise.  
Thus, for a judge from the class of 1968 whose value of Flunks was 6, his value of Cl-98 
* Flunks would be 0*6 = 0.  The non-interacted variables give us the impact of the 
variable on an initial TDC posting for the population as a whole.  The interacted variables 
tell us whether the Secretariat treated the 1998 class differently from the others. 
  The positive number of .117 on University of Tokyo affiliation indicates that 
judges who attended Tokyo were more likely than the others to start at the TDC.  The z-
statistic of 1.91 indicates that the coefficient is   greater than 0 at nearly the 5 percent 
significance level, giving us  a moderate level of assurance that the effect did not result 
from coincidence.  The marginal effect of .117 indicates that a Tokyo graduate is about 
12 percent more likely than others to obtain this posting.   
  Similarly, the marginal effect of -.03 on Flunks indicates that each year a judge 
flunks the LRTI reduces his chances of starting at the TDC by 3 percent.  This effect is 
highly significant, at better than the 1 percent level.  The coefficients on sex and 
University of Kyoto affiliation, however, are not significant.  Thus, the smaller 
percentage of women relative to men starting at TDC that we saw in Panel A is not big 
enough, given the small starting number of female judges, for us to conclude that sex 
actually mattered to initial appointment.   
  The interaction variables indicate that the Secretariat continues to favor Tokyo 
graduates and those who pass the LRTI exam quickly.  The coefficient on the interacted 
Tokyo variable is positive, and that on the interacted Flunk variable is negative -- but the 
z-statistics are 1.48 and 1.73.  Those z-statistics are too low for us to conclude that the 
Secretariat favors such judges more strongly as before, but neither does it seem that they 
favored them less strongly.  
  Note that the coefficient on the interacted sex variable is positive and significant 
at the 10 percent level:  the data do not tell us whether the Secretariat favored men earlier 
(when there were few women), but by 1998 (when women were 19 percent of the group) 
                     
22 For our database as a whole, U. Tokyo graduates flunked the LRTI a mean 3.21 times, U. Kyoto graduates 
flunked it a mean 2.95 times, and the other judges flunked it a mean 4.51 times. Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 16 
it significantly raised its preference for men over women.  This illustrates the value of the 
regression technique.  Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the percentage of women starting 
in TDC rose from 9% pre-1993 to 24% post-1993, a much bigger increase than for men, 
and to a much higher level.  The regression, however, tells us that it is only after 1993 
that we can reliably conclude that the Secretariat gave men a better initial posting than 
women.  
  Thus, we can conclude that the Secretariat did not greatly change the way it 
allocated its initial appointments after 1993.  We do find that the number of women 
increased enough for us to conclude that it appointed women less often to the TDC.  
Obviously, this hardly shows any decreased conservatism.   
 
  (d) Methodological observations.  We will apply the method just described -- first 
look at averages,  characteristic by characteristic, then at regressions -- to various stages 
of a judge’s career.  In each case we will compare the impact of different characteristics 
before and after 1993, using regressions with interacted variables.  For the first 
appointment in a judge’s career, the post-1993 sample was the class of 1998.  For judges 
5-15 years out it will be the class of 1988, for those 15-25 years out the class of 1978, and 
for those 25-35 years out the class of 1968.   
   Two variables we will use in the remainder of the regressions do not appear in 
Table 4.  Leftist judges created a massive controversy in 1969 when a conservative group 
published the YJL membership roster.  Because they had stayed out of the public eye 
until then, their membership did not affect the starting posts of the class of 1968.  
Because of the controversy that ensued, judges of later classes did not join the League.
23  
For these reasons, we exclude YJL membership in Table 4.  Because no members of the 
1998 class attended the University of Kyoto (we do not know why the courts recruit 
fewer judges from the University of Kyoto than in the past), we also excluded an 
interacted Kyoto variable.   
  In the regressions to follow, we will use the “tobit” technique instead of “probit.”  
Probit is appropriate when the dependent variable (TDC) can take only two values.  Tobit 
is appropriate when the dependent variable (the percentage of a decade in a particular 
kind of post) cannot be less than 0 or greater than 100.  
 
  (e) Early intermediate career (years 5-15) postings.  Administrative jobs.  After 
starting its top recruits at the TDC, the Secretariat continues to favor them through the 
early intermediate years (years 5-15) of their careers.  Take its decisions about whom to 
name to prestigious administrative posts (Table 5, Panel A).
24  Both before and after 
1993, judges who started in the TDC, who were graduates of Tokyo University, and who 
were male spent more years in the prestigious administrative posts.  Most dramatically, 
those who started at the TDC spent 28% of their decade 5-15 in administrative posts, 
compared to a mere 6% for other judges.  
  [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
                     
23 So we have been told.  As our YJL roster dates from 1969, it obviously would not list any judges who 
joined after that date. 
24 E.g., as an instructor at the LRTI, at the Secretariat, or at the Ministry of Justice.  A judge with “sokatsu” 
responsibilities is not included, on the ground that such a judge will still be spending most of his time judging cases.   Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 17 
  Panel C of Table 5 uses regression analysis to explore which variables are truly 
significant determinants of administrative postings, and whether their importance 
changed over time.  The dependent variable is thus the fraction of the decade covering the 
5
th to 15
th years of a judge’s career that a judge spent in administrative posts.  As 
independent variables, we include the variables in Table 4, along with a dummy equal to 
1 if the judge had been a member of the YJL in 1969, and a dummy equal to 1 if he 
started his career at the TDC.   
  Because judges in the class of 1988 were at years 5-15 during 1993-2003, we also 
interact all variables with class of 1988 affiliation.  As in Table 4, these interacted 
variables let us test formally whether the Secretariat treated judges at this career stage 
differently during 1993-2003 than it had treated preceding “generations.”  Because no 
class of 1988 member joined the YJL, we omit the interacted term of that variable. 
  During the three decades from 1973 to 2003, the Secretariat significantly favored 
its TDC starters over their colleagues.  The marginal effect of .19 indicates that such 
judges spent nearly two extra years of the decade with administrative responsibilities.  
The effect is statistically significant at better than the 1 percent level.   
  The Secretariat also favored men at this early intermediate stage of their career.  
This effect is also significant at the 1 percent level.  The impact of YJL membership is 
not statistically significant, consistent with YJL members spending 10% of the decade 
and non-members 9% of the decade in administrative posts (Panel C).  University 
affiliation and Flunks are also not statistically significant.  This is less surprising than it 
might seem, because these variables do increase the chance of starting at the TDC (Table 
4).  Given the impact of the initial TDC appointment, Flunks and university affilation do 
indirectly affect the 5-15 decade performance.    
  The interaction variables again indicate that little has changed since 1993.  The 
Secretariat now significantly favors Kyoto graduates more than it did before.  The most 
interesting change is that failing the LRTI exam fewer times, a characteristic of little 
direct importance to this part of a judge’s career before 1993, does have a noticeable, if 
small, effect afterwards.  A judge who flunked the LRTI exam one more time than the 
median judge spends 1.2% less of the decade  in an administrative post.  The low 
significance levels on the other interacted variables show that the Secretariat has 
otherwise simply continued its practices from the past. 
 
  Branch offices.  Panel B suggests that many of the same variables affect  the 
fraction of the decade a judge spends in branch offices or summary courts (albeit in the 
opposite direction).  Before 1993, judges who started at the TDC, who graduated from 
either the U. Tokyo or the U. Kyoto, who failed the LRTI exam fewer times, and who 
avoided the YJL spent less time in these undesirable posts.  Curiously, it also indicates 
that women spent less time there than men.  Other than the favoritism toward elite college 
students, it further suggests that these phenomena continued after 1993. 
  Because simple summary statistics are only suggestive, however, let us turn to the 
regression results in Panel D.  This panel shows the result of a regression of the 
percentage of the 5-15 decade spent in branch offices or summary courts.  For these jobs, 
YJL membership is significant -- a YJL member spent 1 more year in a branch office on 
average (the median judge in the classes of 58, 68, or 78 spent 3 years in branch offices 
during the 5-15 decade).  Having flunked the LRTI exam more times is a highly Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 18 
significant predictor of branch office posting, and a first posting in TDC is a significant 
negative predictor.  The effect of the university variables, however, is insignificant.  
Interestingly enough, men did indeed spend more time in branch offices than women 
(14.2% more).  
  The interaction variables show two changes after 1993. First, Kyoto graduates did 
not go to branch offices (recall that they also took administrative jobs more often; Panel 
D).  Second, the effect of being male disappeared.  The marginal effect of -.106 for class 
of 1988 males effectively neutralizes the marginal effect of .142 for males generally.  
Otherwise, the Secretariat largely continued its earlier practices. 
 
  (f) Later intermediate career (years 15-25) postings.   Administrative jobs.  In this 
phase of his career a judge will usually spend much more time in administrative posts 
than before.  Panel A of Table 6 shows that pre-1993 judges who started in the TDC 
spent a full 61% of the decade between their 15
th and 25
th years in administrative posts, 
and the figure was as high as 32% even for the other judges.  The averages in Panel A 
show few changes from before 1993 to after, except that women seem to do much worse 
after 1993. 
The regression results, however, show that the Secretariat did not   change its 
treatment of women after 1993 (Panel C).  Instead, other things held equal, women spent 
less time in administrative posts even before 1993 (two years less of the decade).  That 
phenomenon did not thereafter change.  Attending the University of Tokyo or Kyoto and 
starting one’s career in the TDC helped one’s career.  Being a member of the YJL 
significantly hurt it.  For this phase of a judge’s career, nothing changed after 1993:  
every one of the interaction variables is statistically insignificant.   
  [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
 
  Branch offices.  Oddly enough, being a YJL member seems not to have affected 
whether a judge spent time in a branch office during his later intermediate career.  What 
did matter was (as with obtaining administrative jobs) whether he graduated from the 
Universities of Tokyo or Kyoto and spent his first years at the TDC (Panel B).  Where a 
non-YJL judge spent 18 percent of the decade in branch offices, the YJL member spent 
only 3 percent more.  But where U. Tokyo graduates spent 11 percent, the others spent 
twice as much time there.  Where the U. Kyoto graduates spent 7 percent, the others 
spent three times as much.  Those who started at the TDC spent 8 percent of the decade 
in branch offices, while the rest spent 21 percent.  And those who failed the LRTI exam 
fewer times spent fewer years in branch offices. 
  The regressions (Panel D) confirm the insignificance of YJL membership on 
branch office postings at this stage of a judge’s career.  They also confirm both that elite 
university graduates spent less time in branch offices before 1993, and that the Secretariat 
did not significantly change that policy thereafter.  They indicate that the Secretariat 
favored TDC starters both before and after 1993, that any preference for low-Flunk 
judges appeared significant only after 1993, and that the effect of sex was insignificant.   
 
  (g) Late career (years 25-35) postings.  Administrative jobs.  The last phase of a 
judge’s career is especially interesting for us because the years after 1993 cover the class 
of 1968, the last class to contain YJL members.  Judges in later classes have not yet Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 19 
reached this stage of their careers.  As a result, we here compare the class of 1958’s late 
career (from 1983 to 1993) with the class of 1968’s (from 1993 to 2003).   
  Panel A of Table 7 shows that before 1993, most of our judge characteristics 
hardly matter to administrative appointments.  Judges who started in the TDC did no 
better than those who did not; in this context at least, the effect of a good start seems 
finally to have worn off 25 years after graduation.  The effect of youthful indiscretion has 
not, however.  The one characteristic that shows a substantial impact on administrative 
appointments is YJL membership:  those who had joined the group decades earlier were 
still spending 19% less time in administrative jobs (Panel C).   
  [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
  The penalty on YJL membership continues post-1993, and the other variables 
start showing an effect too:  at least by the simple averages of Panel A, after 1993 judges 
who started at the TDC did better than those who did not; Universities of Tokyo and 
Kyoto graduates did better than the others; and those who passed the LRTI exam quickly 
did better than those who failed repeatedly.  Has the Crisis of 1993 at last produced a 
change in judicial careers, for those judges senior enough to be in positions of power?  
  The regression results say no:  in fact, very little has changed (Panel C).  YJL 
membership continues to have a negative effect.  The effect is significant, subtracting 
1.75 years from a judge's time in administrative jobs.  Crucially, the small and 
insignificant marginal effect of .028 for the interaction variable shows that the adverse 
effect of YJL membership persists after 1993.  Neither the brief stint under a Socialist 
Prime Minister nor the LDP's loss of its long-term lock on power helped judges who had 
shown their leftwing leanings 25 years before.  We cannot say whether this was because 
of their actual membership, or just because of the beliefs that induced them to become 
members, but in either case, the actively leftist young judges were doing worse than other 
judges in their late careers.  
  The other variables show little effect on administrative postings.  Although men 
seem to have done better than women before 1993, the absence of more than two women 
in the 1958 class makes the calculated coefficient unreliable.  All other calculated effects 
are insignificant before 1993.  Only being a Kyoto graduate had a significant effect 
afterwards.   
 
  Branch offices.  Time spent in branch offices in a judge’s late career tells a similar 
story, with two differences (Panels B and D).  First, although none of our judge 
characteristics predicts branch office time significantly before 1993, after 1993 TDC start 
does.  Having begun one's career at the TDC does reduce the amount of time a judge 
spends in branch offices 25 years later.  Apparently, the “good start” effect does persist 
here, even if not with administrative jobs.  Second, YJL is as unimportant as the other 
variables in predicting branch office time.  YJL membership seems to have reduced the 
rewards to a judge, but not increased the penalties.  
 
  (h) Summary.  This has been a bewildering number of regressions,   but they let 
us explore whether anything has happened during the 1990’s to any of the phases of a 
Japanese judge’s career.  Several conclusions emerge.  First, merit -- at least as measured 
by the quality of a judge’s college, his first assignment, or the number of times he failed 
the LRTI exam --  has not diminished in importance.  In some contexts (e.g. branch office Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 20 
assignments in mid to late career) these meritocratic variables have become even more 
important than they were before 1993.  Second, men now do better than women.  
Paradoxically, however, that phenomenon may just reflect the fact that too few women 
joined the courts before the 1990’s to measure the effect of sex with much confidence.  
Third, the adverse effects of YJL membership continued even into the 1990’s, long after 
the events of 1968.  Whether because of the continued stigma of membership or, more 
likely, because youthful membership can signal leftwing sympathies that last a lifetime, 
YJL judges suffered lagging careers even thirty years later.   
  Although the LDP lost its dominance in 1993, that loss did not reduce the career 
pressures, political or meritocratic, on lower court judges.  Instead, the Secretariat 
continued to administer the courts much as it had done before.  What was an earthquake 
in electoral politics left the judges with much the same incentives they had always had.  
 
II.  The Case for Managed Judges 
  What should we make of all this?  Does the Japanese Constitution need a drastic 
overhaul?   Did it (and we drafted it, after all) create this mess?  Or is it even a mess? 
 
A.  The Constraints: 
1.   Japan.  -- The Japanese Constitution did not generate this system.  The 
Constitutions of Japan and the United States do not treat the courts very differently.  In 
both, Supreme Court justices are appointed by the executive branch.  They cannot be 
removed except by impeachment or, in Japan, through popular vote or upon reaching 
retirement age.  Lower-court judges in Japan serve ten-year terms but, as we noted, the 
government almost always renews their terms.  It cannot cut their pay, and neither can it 
discipline them except for gross misconduct.  The court system is formally independent, 
and the Supreme Court has the last word on the law.  All this is essentially the same in 
both countries.   
What differs is the internal structure of the courts, which neither country’s 
Constitution dictates.  According to the constitutional text, Japanese politicians could 
reorganize the courts by statute and insulate them from even indirect political control.  
According to the text, American politicians could reorganize the federal courts and rein in 
judges who opposed their wishes.  
Start with Japan.  The only constitutional constraint on internal court structure 
appears in Article 80: 
 
[J]udges of the inferior courts [shall] be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of 
persons nominated  by the Supreme Court.  All such judges shall hold office for a 
term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be 
retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law. 
 
Article 80 does not mandate the system Japan now has.  Granted, it does require  
the Cabinet to obtain the consent of the existing Supreme Court for its lower-court 
nominees, instead of the consent of the  upper house, as in the United States.  Yet giving 
the Court that veto increases the power  of the courts rather than reducing it. The rest of 
Article 80 also need not be adverse to the power and independence of the judiciary.  If the 
Japanese parliament wanted to give judges life tenure, it could change the statutory Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 21 
retirement age from 65 to 120.  If it wanted to end three-year rotations, it could mandate   
appointment to specific courts in specific regions.  These are matters of statute and 
administrative practice, not constitution.   
 
2.  The United States. -- Perhaps more surprisingly, the U.S. constitutional text 
does not prevent the U.S. from having  a system like Japan’s.  The Constitution does not 
mandate federal circuits.  By statute, Congress could abolish them and empower the 
Chief Justice to decide the location and court at which each federal judge would work.  It 
could allow the Chief Justice to run a personnel office that would preliminarily make that 
decision.  And it could permit him to staff that office with the judges he finds brightest 
and most trustworthy, serving there at his pleasure.  As in Japan, he could then transfer 
judges whose rulings displeased him to places the judges did not want to live.  
  Even under the existing statutory framework, a President with a loyal Chief 
Justice could use postings to punish a disagreeable judge.  Suppose one President 
appointed prominent University of Chicago Professor I. Jones to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in downtown Chicago, conveniently near his home.  Four years later, 
suppose Jones started enjoining the successor President’s legislation.  The new President 
could not fire Jones or cut his pay (U.S. Const., art III sec. 1).  Neither could he disregard 
Jones' injunctions (though he could appeal them).  But if the Chief Justice agreed, he 
could find an overworked court that needed more judges.  By 28 U.S.C. Sec. 291, he 
could then order Jones to show up “temporarily” for work in such courts.  Pinch-hitting 
Jones might have to move from Omaha to Tallahassee to Anchorage and back again.  
  If the President (like the LDP) controlled the legislative branch, he could go 
further.  Suppose he wanted to punish not just Jones but the entire Seventh Circuit.  He 
could merge it into the adjoining Eighth (by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 48).  He could then require 
the Chicago judges to rotate through St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, and St. Paul.  
  Does all this sound implausible?  In fact, many of the statutes are already in place. 
About half of the judges sitting in U.S. federal district courts are in a special class of 
judges created by the Federal Magistrate’s Act of 1968  who are appointed by other 
judges,  serve eight-year terms, and can be fired for poor performance.
25  The  
Administrative Office Act of 1939 created the circuit judicial councils, administrative 
bodies run by the judges.
26  And the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980 authorized the judicial councils to reprimand judges, to take away 
all their cases, or to  certify them as disabled.
27     
  Even reprimands, however, seem to be uncommon, even if misbehavior does 
occur.  Geyh reports that   “Instances of judicial  misconduct included judges who 
appointed relatives as court officers or who heard cases litigated by relatives;  judges who 
                     
25  Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 Val. U.L. Rev. 661,663 
(2005). 
26 Administrative Office Act, § 305, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939). 
27 “Action by the judicial council under paragraph (1)(C) may include…  ordering that, on a temporary basis 
for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to the judge  … censuring or reprimanding such judge… certifying 
disability of the judge … requesting that the judge voluntarily retire…”  28 U.S.C. § 1,16, § 354  (2005). A judge 
certified as disabled can be replaced as if he had died, and descends into an uncertain status “junior in commission to 
the other judges of the circuit”,  28 U.S.C. § 1,17, § 372  (2005). From six to thirteen judges--- poor records are kept--- 
were involuntarily certified as disabled as of 1993. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 
142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243, 275 (1993).  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 22 
improperly refused to disqualify themselves;   judges who were suspected of corruption;   
judges who billed the government for questionable expenses;   and judges who were 
accused of being excessively aggressive in moving cases on their dockets.   Instances of 
judicial inaction included both judges who delayed decision-making and judges who took 
extended vacations…”.
28   The leading case is Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth 
Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).  Chief Judge Chandler’s “docket was backlogged, he had 
been named as a defendant in civil and criminal cases, and he had been issued writs of 
mandamus twice for failing to disqualify himself from hearing cases where he had an 
alleged bias toward one of the parties.”
29  The Judicial Council ordered that he be given 
no new cases and his existing ones be taken away from him.  He filed a motion with the 
Supreme Court, but the Court ducked the issue of constitutionality and rejected the 
motion on procedural grounds.  Even here, however, the judge’s punishment  was merely 
embarrassing publicity and a reduction in his workload.  American judges  do not have 
significant power over other Article III judges, but that is a matter of statute and custom, 
not the Constitution.  
The basis for the Japanese approach thus does not lie in the constitutional text.  It 
lies in statute, and in the competitive internal labor market that statutes create.  Given the 
electoral markets in which Japanese legislators must compete to survive, it lies in the 
preferences voters hold.  
 
B.  The Alternating Parties Theory of Judicial Independence: 
  If the texts of the constitutions do not dictate the different judicial systems, why 
then do the Japanese and U.S. courts operate so differently?  In earlier work we proposed 
an alternating parties theory of judicial independence.
30  Consider an incumbent political 
party that must decide whether to “manage” its judges or keep them “independent.”  
Ignore for the present considerations of efficiency in everyday law (see Sec. D, below).  
Look instead at politically charged cases like election law and reapportionment 
disappointments. 
  In these charged cases, suppose the incumbent party prefers managed judges.  We 
represent this preference in Table 8 with a payoff of 10 from managed judges and  8 from 
independent and unbiased ones.  The opposition party prefers the independent and 
unbiased judges, which we represent by a payoff of 6 compared to 0 for managed judges.  
The particular numbers merely indicate the ordering of preferences rather than size, 
except for the following crucial point:  the sum of the parties’ payoffs is greater when 
judges are independent and unbiased.  We postulate this because both parties value 
predictable decisions that follow the legal text, and unbiased decisions promote such 
qualities.  
                     
28 Geyh, supra note, at 263, footnotes omitted. Geyh describes a sample of complaints and their results, as 
does Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence 
Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1993). 
29 Geyh, supra note,  at 269.  
30 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note xxx, chapter 7.  Other   recent examples of the theory include Tom 
Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003),   F. Andrew 
Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 712 (2004), and  Lee 
Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova, Selection Selection Systems, chapter 9 of Judicial Independence at the 
Crossroads, ed. Stephen Burbank and Barry Friedman (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002).  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 23 
  [Insert Table 8 about here.]  
  If the Table 8 parties play the game as a one-shot game, then the incumbent will 
choose managed judges regardless of whether that hurts his opponent more than it helps 
him.  In the one-shot version, efficiency yields to self-interest.  If the parties repeat the 
game indefinitely, however, matters potentially change.  Suppose they hold an election 
every four years, and with each election the opposition party obtains a chance to become 
the new incumbent and itself use the judiciary selfishly.  If the incumbent enjoys very 
high odds of winning the next election--more than a 3 in 4 chance, using our example’s 
numbers---  nothing changes.  
  Matters do change if the opposition obtains a serious chance of winning the next 
election.  Suppose the bias to the decisions by managed judges do not deny the opposition 
that chance.  Two possible equilibria now emerge.  First, each party may choose to 
manage the judges when it is in power, knowing that the other party will not later reward 
any forbearance with its own forbearance.  This inefficient equilibrium will then become 
a self-fulfilling expectation.  If each party has a 50% chance of winning an election, this 
will yield an average payoff of 5 to each party, 50% times 10 plus 50% times 0.   
  Second, each party may choose independent and unbiased judges while in power, 
in the belief that if it leaves the courts alone the other party will as well.  This efficient 
equilibrium can also generate self-fulfilling beliefs.  Each party’s average payoff will 
now be 7 (50% times 8 plus 50% times 6),--  higher than the average payoff of 5 in the 
inefficient equilibrium.
31  
  Turn now to the possibility of independent but biased judges:  judges who feel 
free to decide cases against the incumbent, but who do so according to their own political 
preferences rather than the law.  They would produce politicized law rather than efficient 
law -- to what, referring to the current Supreme Court, Richard Posner characterized as 
“essentially personal, subjective, and indeed arbitrary” opinions
32 -- but not necessarily 
law politicized to help the incumbent.  Rather, the outcome will be random politicization.  
Whether the incumbent wins his election law case or not will depend on sheer luck.  
Because half of the decisions will favor each party and all outcomes will generate poor 
law, we assign expected payoffs of 5 to both the incumbent and the opposition.  If the 
two parties expect to alternate in incumbency and opposition, they are indifferent 
between managed judges and independent judges, because both yield expected payoffs of 
5.  They would prefer independent unbiased judges, for expected payoffs of 7 each.  On 
the other hand, if a party expects to be in power enough of the time, it would prefer 
managed judges -- with a payoff of 10 whenever it is in power -- to independent biased 
judges.  Thus, a system of independent but biased judges is never optimal.  We 
nevertheless raise the possibility to emphasize that judicial independence does not 
remove politicization from the judiciary and, in fact, can make things worse.   
  Consider now the United States and pre-1993 Japan. Competition for control of 
the federal executive branch of the United States is vigorous and the Democratic and 
                     
31 If the payoffs are defined in terms of utility rather than money, as is standard in game theory, then Table 8 
already incorporates risk aversion.  The reason a player prefers the 8/6 payoff combination to 10/0 is not that although 
the payoff of 10 is the highest, the extra benefit to the incumbent from biased judges is less than the extra loss to the 
opposition. This is why average payoff from  the independent but biased judges is  worse than with independent judges, 
despite the 5/5 payoff having less risk.   
32 Richard A. Posner, Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 40 (2005). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 24 
Republican parties alternate in power.  Federal judges are independent, and -- when 
politically biased -- biased in both directions in ways that largely track the biases of the 
Presidents who appointed them.  In Japan through 1993, on the other hand, the LDP was 
secure in power.  As the incumbent party in Table 8, it preferred a system of managed 
judges, and that is the system that continued through its years in power.     
 
C.  Japan after 1993: 
  Why then did things not change in Japan after 1993?  Once the LDP lost its 
traditional high probability of victory in every election, does not our alternating parties 
theory suggest that it would choose a more independent court system?  Would it not 
expect that it could best promote its future interests if it disabled the Supreme Court and 
Secretariat  from interfering with the careers of lower-court judges?  After all, if it 
continued to maintain political and "managed" courts, its rivals would likely intervene 
equally politically whenever they came to power.  Yet when the LDP returned to power, 
the age and background of the Supreme Court justices did not change.  Neither did the 
career patterns in the lower courts.  
  The lack of change in the age and background of Supreme Court justices  from 
1993 to 1996 is easy to explain.  The multi-party coalition of 1993 had "other fish to fry," 
and did not bother trying to renovate the court system it inherited.  The LDP-Socialist 
coalition that followed was equally unstable and, locked in a coalition with the LDP, was 
not likely to change radically the system the LDP had designed.  Murayama did not break 
with the tradition of appointing an elderly lower-court judge to a particular Supreme 
Court “line”, though he did manage to find a YJL member who fit that description.  After 
1996, however, the LDP seems to have been equally unwilling to abandon its system of 
"managed" lower-court judges and its tradition of appointing Supreme Court justices 
close to retirement.  
  Perhaps the LDP —- and the pro-LDP holdovers on the Supreme Court -- wanted 
to change to the efficient equilibrium of independent and unbiased judges, but did not 
think they could change expectations.  Remember, even with alternating parties, the 
inefficient equilibrium can continue as a set of self-fulfilling expectations; it is just that 
the alternation makes a more efficient equilibrium potentially self-fulfilling as well.  
Perhaps in 1996 the LDP thought that its successor would "manage" the courts politically 
no matter what strategy it chose.  
  Or maybe our Table 8 alternating parties theory does not really describe Japan.  In 
the theory, we assume that the combined payoffs of the opposition and the government 
are higher when judges are independent.  This could be false for at least three reasons.  
  First, the LDP did not need courts to be independent for people to trust it to honor 
the terms of its legislation.  Through its long track record, by 1993 it had already built a 
solid reputation for keeping its promises.  Landes and Posner suggested that politicians 
establish independent courts not because they fear what would happen in elections, but 
because no one would otherwise believe the promises they made their constituents.  A 
government may establish a patent system, but inventors will not respond unless they 
think it will honor the patent later.  By creating independent courts that force itself to 
honor the patents, it makes its promise to inventors credible.  The logic applies to all 
government promises, from the promise not to take property without compensation, to the 
promise to pay contractors for road projects.  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 25 
  The LDP, however, had less need for this kind of commitment mechanism.  It had 
long been in power.  Unlike a new party, it had a good track record for reliability in 
honoring deals, even if not for abstention from collecting the proceeds from such deals.   
  Second, in the Japanese system of "managed judges," the judiciary (even if not 
the judges) is independent.  Although politicians choose Supreme Court justices in both 
the United States and Japan, in neither can they fire the justices.  In an extreme 
constitutional crisis  -- say, an executive who wants, Hitler-like, to grant himself 
dictatorial powers -- we could expect both Supreme Courts to behave similarly (whether 
similarly well or similarly badly is hard to say).  The difference between the U.S. and 
Japanese judiciaries lies in the lower courts.  
In the "managed judges" system of Japan, the lower-court judges lack 
independence.  They are free of direct control by politicians, but the Supreme Court and 
Secretariat control their careers.  Although the Secretariat must pick the judges from the 
small but talented pool of people who have passed a difficult examination and chosen a 
judicial career, it can punish and neutralize dissident judges without overruling each of 
their decisions.   Japan can avoid the outcome of independent but biased judges relatively 
easily:  the Secretariat selects judges for ability rather than interest in politics, and 
suppresses any lower-court judge who does develop a taste for making public policy.  At 
the same time, if the Secretariat—following the wishes of the voters and the LDP--- does 
want the lower-court judges to make public policy intelligently, filling gaps left  by 
statutes, it can reward judges for their policymaking ability.  It is just that those 
policymaking judges may be punished if they choose policies of which the Secretariat 
disapproves.  Obviously, this leaves little scope for the judge to indulge his personal 
political tastes.  
In the United States, however, the President and Senate pick lower-court judges, 
and once picked those judges enjoy secure jobs.  Although this enables the President to 
pick politically loyal judges, it reduces his (or the Supreme Court's) ability to control 
them.
33  Thus, the Supreme Court of Japan has more power over the courts than the 
Supreme Court of the United States, even though it rarely overturns its statutes or injoins 
the government.
34   
Happy with such a system, perhaps the LDP decided that its best strategy in the 
new competitive environment was to establish as  an equilibrium a self-perpetuating 
independent judiciary -- independent, but with conservative inclinations.  Granted, if it 
shifted to appointing justices at age 50 it could reduce the ability of successors to appoint 
new justices.  It would also, however, create a new tradition of radical change in the 
judiciary of which those successors might take full advantage.  And it would give the 50-
year-old justice more years to change his conservative inclinations and decide that he 
liked making public policy.  Regardless of whether he stayed conservative or shifted to 
the left, he would reduce the power of the executive and legislative branches.  Better, the 
LDP perhaps reasoned, to continue its tradition of appointing old justices.  
                     
33 As Posner, supra note, at 63, put it, “life tenure on a fixed salary ..., so that there are neither carrots nor 
sticks ... is a temptation to irresponsibility.”   
34 Recall that the United States Supreme Court only invalidated two federal statutes in its first 70 years--- in  
Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)  and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (William H. 
Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 579, 585 (2004). The Japanese Constitution of 1947 has only 
been with us 59 years.  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 26 
   Third, the system of "managed judges" works.  Independent but biased judges 
create a mish-mash of law attractive to neither the incumbent nor the opposition.  They 
do so in everyday cases as well as electorally sensitive ones.  "Managed judges" will be 
more consistent even than independent and unbiased judges, as we will explain in the 
next section.  
   
D.  The Benefits: 
Managed judges yield dramatic benefit for Japanese citizens.  The judges may 
favor the politics of their manager.  But they also have a strong incentive to perform.  By 
placing them within a competitive internal labor market, the Japanese government has 
given them strong incentives along two crucial dimensions:  to work hard, and to decide 
similar cases similarly.   
 
  1.  Rhetoric. -- If we miss the virtues of managed judges in the academy, we miss 
them because we assume that with judicial independence, more is better than less.  A 
little common sense goes a long way here.  Judges are government employees.  They may 
have gold-plated educations.  They may be smart.  They may be sophisticated.  They may 
even be rich, in comparison to postal workers.  But they are still government employees.  
And like all government employees -- like all human beings -- they do more and better 
work if someone notices and rewards them for their efforts.   
  Unfortunately, in the rhetoric with which we describe all matters legal, we lose 
that simple truth.  We speak of the legal "profession" rather than the legal services 
industry.  We speak of "access to justice" rather than of helping people win their quarrels.  
To referee these quarrels, we hire (and pay  from the public fisc) a specialized corps of 
government workers called judges.  But at least in the federal courts, we neither supervise 
them nor give them incentives to work hard.  Instead, we glorify their essential 
irresponsibility.  As Henry Hart put it:
35 
 
  [T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling 
tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the 
structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged with the 
creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing 
impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law .... 
 
As with the academic freedom for we professors, the judicial independence of judges is 
romantic and comfortable, but not the situation best suited to intense effort or strict 
accountability.  Indeed, judges do not even have to worry about having their opinions 
rejected for publication.  We would not therefore expect  federal judges to operate as 
efficiently as, for instance, civil-service administrators in the Department of Agriculture, 
who must compete for promotion, even if they have little fear of unemployment.     
 
  2.  Results. -- In Japan, politicians do not insulate their judges.  Instead, judges 
who bring talent and energy to the job are rewarded.  The (relatively) dull and lazy fail to 
advance. 
                     
35 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword:  The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99 (1959).  The 
sentence is charcterized as "the famous purple passage" by Posner, supra note, at 72. Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 27 
  The results are impressive.  Where the federal and state governments in the U.S. 
employ 27,000 judges and magistrates, the Japanese government uses barely 3,000 
regular and summary court judges.
36  With half the American population, Japan makes do 
with one ninth the number of judges.   
  These many fewer judges process cases with  the alacrity of many of our federal 
courts.  Overall, federal district courts decide about 65 percent of their cases within a 
year, and 85 percent within two years.  Japanese courts decide 55 percent within a year 
and 78 percent within two.  That is slower than the federal courts on average, but close -- 
and that   puts them far ahead of many state court systems.
37 
  Although the competitive labor market within the Japanese judiciary does induce 
judges to work hard and to work smart -- the Secretariat does look at case management as 
one skill they want to see in  a judge - the key to the spectacular performance of the 
national system probably does not lie in judicial effort.  We obviously speculate here, and 
turn to issues beyond the scope of our data.  But the key to the success of the Japanese 
judiciary probably lies instead in uniformity  -- particularly, in the uniformity of the 
judicial output.  When monitoring and evaluating its employees (i.e., judges), the 
Secretariat does examine how hard they work.  It apparently weighs docket-clearance 
rates heavily (we have long wished we had the data for our regressions).  And that fact 
obviously affects how rapidly judges process cases.  Yet the Secretariat also examines 
output quality.  Do judges follow precedent?  Do they decide cases the same way other 
judges have decided similar cases in the past?  By requiring judges to decide like cases 
alike, this increases the predictability of the adjudicative process.    In turn, that 
predictability promotes settlement.  Whether in the U.S. or in Japan, litigation is 
expensive.  As a result, anywhere in the world most disputants litigate a quarrel only if 
they cannot agree on the expected  outcome of the litigation.  More specifically, they 
litigate only if they each are optimistic about the outcome.
38 
  Through its monitoring, the Secretariat reduces the variance in the adjudicative 
process.  By reducing that variance, it reduces the fraction of disputes in which the parties 
both estimate their chances in litigation optimistically.  And by reducing that incidence of 
mutual optimism, it increases the ability of parties to settle their dispute and pocket the 
fees they would otherwise pay their lawyers.
39 
 
  3.   Politics.  -- The "costs" of these managed judges are far lower than most 
commentators claim.  Although we often focus on political cases, as being the most 
interesting, very few cases raise political issues.  Notwithstanding our use of terms like 
"justice," "fairness," and "equity," the vast majority of court cases in any modern society 
are mundane in the extreme:  primarily, traffic accidents and debt collection disputes.  In 
consensual transactions such as debt contracts, however, the expected litigated outcome 
                     
36 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook (On line, 2005). 
37 J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law:  An Economic Approach 140-41 tab. 6.1 (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1999) (data for 1994). 
38 The point is well known, and stems from the early work, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis 
of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973). 
39 J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant:  Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in 
Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud. 263 (1989). Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 28 
of a dispute necessarily generates offsetting ex ante adjustments to terms (inaccurate 
court assessments of expectation damages cause contracts to include liquidated damage 
terms, for example).  As a result, even of these two categories of cases, only traffic 
accidents raise any serious issues of fairness. 
  What is more, even in those rare politically sensitive cases, a Japanese-style 
monitoring system will usually just induce judges to deliver the policies and programs 
that the electorate wants.  In comparing countries like Japan and the U.S., politicians win 
office only through highly competitive electoral markets.  Necessarily, those who do not 
deliver the portfolio of policies and programs demanded by a majority of the electorate 
do not stay in power.  When those majority politicians enforce on judges their political 
"bias," they largely -- with exceptions to be sure -- merely force their judges to deliver the 
same.
40   
 
III.  Conclusions 
  In Japan, as in the United States, everybody loves judicial independence---as an 
abstract concept.  That includes the Chief Justice and his colleagues.  Were he to examine 
the concept a little more closely, however, even the U.S. Chief Justice’s enthusiasm 
might wane.  Does he really prefer having judges in the lower courts who are independent 
enough to flout his wishes without any consequence except the occasional reversal, a 
reversal that leaves a case’s outcome no worse, in the judge's view, than if he had stayed 
subservient to the Supreme Court in the first place?  Might the Chief Justice not prefer to 
be able to transfer a troublesome lower-court judge—-in his view, an incompetent judge--
-  away from an appellate court or a big-city trial court to a divorce court in the 
hinterland?    
  To calm the Chief Justice' troubled conscience, we would point out that giving 
him the power to transfer a troublesome judge does not necessarily reduce the 
independence of the judiciary.  It reduces the independence of individual lower-court 
judges, to be sure, but it is a transfer of power from one kind of judge to another, from the 
lower-court judges to the Chief Justice.  The net effect would be to strengthen the 
judiciary as a branch of government, not to weaken it:  unity strengthens an organization.  
Not only would the judiciary speak with one voice, but the lower court judges, if not the 
Chief Justice, would have stronger incentives  to work harder, and the most important 
positions would go to the hardest-working and smartest judges.  Actually, they would go 
only to the hardest-working and smartest judges of those willing to toe the line, but merit 
would nonetheless play a key role in selection.    
                     
40 Commentators sometimes raise the need to protect "powerless" minorities.  Yet if the majority party in the 
legislature will not protect them, we see little reason to think their appointees in court would do so either.  
Commentators routinely invoke the civil rights cases won by the African-American community.  Most of these cases 
African-Americans won only after they became a key component of the coalition behind the Democratic Party.  They 
did not win civil rights in court because they were politically powerless.  They only began winning them after they 
ceased to be powerless.  This thesis’s best known advocate is Gerald Rosenberg, in his 1991 The Hollow Hope: Can 
Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: Chicago University Press).  A  rejoinder is Paul Frymer, Acting when 
Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions 1935-85, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 483 (2003), which argues that the courts desesegregated labor unions when elected officials failed to act.  That 
article confirms, however, that court action only began to be effective  after the late 1960’s, when African-American 
political power had grown, and that attempts to give the EEOC more enforcement power were opposed not only by 
southern members of Congress, but by civil rights lawyers who preferred private enforcement.  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 29 
  Japan has had such a judicial system, with much success.  Despite its constraints, 
it has attracted some of the best and brightest of university graduates.  Indeed, perhaps it 
attracts those graduates precisely because of its constraints.  After all, the system clearly 
and predictably rewards merit among those judges willing to put aside their personal 
political preferences, and such rewards will attract many bright young minds.  Nor need a 
Japanese judge spend the first half of his life cultivating  connections with politicians so 
as to enhance his chances for appointment or election.  All he must do  -- but do 
throughout his career -- is to work hard and pay attention to what the Secretariat wants of 
him.  The system may not, as a result, attract people who want to change the world, but it 
does attract those who are willing and able to implement the law uniformly across the 
country as the Supreme Court wishes.   
  One reason this system has worked well in Japan was  the comfortable but not 
dictatorial dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party before 1993.  With its long time 
horizon and ability to make law via legislative enactment rather than court rulings, the 
LDP was willing to control the courts with a light hand in most matters, with notable 
exceptions such as election law and injunctions, so long as the courts stayed out of 
politics.  After 1993, Japanese politics became more like that of other democratic 
countries, with the incumbent party never very confident that it would win the next 
election.   
  In theory, the LDP's more tenuous hold on power might have led to Supreme 
Court justices appointed younger and serving longer terms.  In theory, it might have led 
to lower-court judges more willing to buck the current Secretariat in the hopes that a 
future one might reward them.  In practice, we have found no evidence of either 
phenomenon.  Rather, we see the courts at all levels continuing much as they did before.  
Is this because the Liberal Democratic Party, which has continued to be in power for 
most of the years between 1993 and 2005 despite its shakier hold, likes the political 
viewpoint of the current judiciary and would not mind establishing a custom of leaving it 
as it has been in the past?  Or is it that the conventional wisdom of LDP insecurity after 
1993 is not shared by the LDP leaders, and they see their hold on power as stronger than 
we do.  We will not pretend to know more about Japanese politics than the leaders of the 
LDP, but we have made our guess about what they believe; look back in ten years, 
readers, and tell us if we were right.    
  Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 30 
 
Table 1:  Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1973 -2003: 
Selected Statistics 
 
 
   
  A.  Justices appointed:      82 
 
  B.  Chief Justices appointed:     7 
 
  C.  Mean age of appointment of Justices –  
 
    1973-1982:    63.8 
    1983-1992:    64.3 
    1993-1997:    64.0 
    1998-2002:    64.0 
 
  D.  Percent Justices appointed from the lower courts --  
    1973-1982:    0.42 
    1983-1992:    0.42 
    1993-1997:    0.29 
    1998-2002:    0.36 
 
  E.  Percent Justices appointed from the bar –  
 
    1973-1982:    0.35 
    1983-1992:    0.31 
    1993-1997:    0.29 
    1998-2002:    0.29 
 
 
  Source:  Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, ed., Zen saibankan 
keireki soran dai 4 ban [Overview of Careers of All Japanese Judges, 
4th ed.] (Tokyo:  Konin sha, 2004). 
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Table 2:  Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1983-2005 
 
 
 
 
Prime 
Minister  Justice  Born  Appointed 
Apprx 
Age  Prior Job 
Chief 
Justice? 
Secretariat 
post? 
Secretary-
General? 
Nakasone  Tsunoda  1920  1983  63  bureaucrat       
Nakasone  Takashima  1919  1984  65  bureaucrat       
Nakasone  Yaguchi  1920  1984  64  judge  yes  yes  yes 
Nakasone  Shimatani  1920  1984  64  lawyer       
Nakasone  Nagashima  1918  1984  66  prosecutor       
Nakasone  Oouchi  1922  1985  63  judge  no  yes  yes 
Nakasone  Fujishima  1924  1985  61  prosecutor       
Nakasone  Kagawa  1921  1986  65  judge  no  no  no 
Nakasone  Sato  1920  1986  66  lawyer       
Nakasone  Sakaue  1923  1986  63  lawyer       
Nakasone  Hayashi  1923  1986  63  lawyer       
Nakasone  Yotsuya  1922  1987  65  judge  no  yes  yes 
Nakasone  Okuno  1920  1987  67  lawyer       
Takeshita  Teika  1923  1988  65  judge  no  no  no 
Takeshita  Oohori  1925  1988  63  prosecutor       
Kaifu  Sonobe  1929  1989  60  judge  no  no  no 
Kaifu  Kusaba  1925  1989  64  judge  yes  yes  yes 
Kaifu  Mimura  1924  1990  66  bureaucrat       
Kaifu  Nakajima  1925  1990  65  bureaucrat       
Kaifu  Kabe  1927  1990  63  judge  no  yes  yes 
Kaifu  Hashimoto  1922  1990  68  lawyer       
Kaifu  Sato  1924  1990  66  lawyer       
Kaifu  Kizaki  1924  1990  66  lawyer       
Miyazawa  Oonishi  1928  1991  63  judge  no  yes  yes 
Miyazawa  Ono  1930  1992  62  judge  no  yes  no 
Miyazawa  Miyoshi  1927  1992  65  judge  yes  yes  no 
Miyazawa  Oono  1927  1993  66  lawyer       
Miyazawa  Ooshiro  na  1993  na  lawyer       
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Table 2 (Cont'd) 
 
 
Prime 
Minister  Justice  Born  Appointed 
Apprx 
Age  Prior Job 
Chief 
Justice? 
Secretariat 
post? 
Secretary-
General? 
Hosokawa  Chigusa  1932  1993  61  judge  no  yes  yes 
Hosokawa  Takahashi  1927  1994  67  bureaucrat       
Hosokawa  Ozaki  1929  1994  65  lawyer       
Hosokawa  Negishi  1928  1994  66  prosecutor       
Murayama  Kawai  1932  1994  62  lawyer       
Murayama  Fukuda  1935  1995  60  bureaucrat       
Murayama  Fujii  1932  1995  63  judge  no  no  no 
Murayama  Endo  1930  1995  65  lawyer       
Murayama  Ijima  1932  1995  63  prosecutor       
Hashimoto  Oode  1932  1997  65  bureaucrat       
Hashimoto  Kanatani  1935  1997  62  judge  no  yes  yes 
Hashimoto  Yamaguchi  1932  1997  65  judge  yes  yes  yes 
Hashimoto  Motohara  1931  1997  66  lawyer       
Obuchi  Kitagawa  1934  1998  64  judge  no  yes  no 
Obuchi  Kameyama  1934  1998  64  prosecutor       
Obuchi  Kajitani  1935  1999  64  lawyer       
Obuchi  Okuda  1932  1999  67  professor       
Obuchi  Machida  1936  2000  64  judge  yes  yes  no 
Mori  Fukazawa  1934  2000  66  lawyer       
Koizumi  Yokoo  1941  2001  60  bureaucrat          
Koizumi  Hamada  1936  2001  65  lawyer       
Koizumi  Ueda  1937  2002  65  judge  no  yes  no 
Koizumi  Shimada  1938  2002  64  judge  no  yes  no 
Koizumi  Izumi  1939  2002  63  judge  no  yes  yes 
Koizumi  Takii  1936  2002  66  lawyer       
Koizumi  Fujita  1940  2002  62  professor       
Koizumi  Kainaka  1940  2002  62  prosecutor          
Koizumi  Tsuno  1938  2004  66  bureaucrat       
Koizumi  Saiguchi  1938  2004  66  lawyer       
Koizumi  Imai  1939  2004  65  judge    yes  no 
Koizumi  Nakegawa  1939  2005  66  lawyer       
Koizumi  Horigome  1940  2005  65  judge    yes  yes 
Koizumi  Furuta  1942  2005  63  prosecutor       
 
 
  Notes:  The 2005 court is in italics.  Chief justices are in 
boldface. Koizumi’s first eight appointments (a court majority) are 
between horizontal lines.  The last column indicates whether the 
justice had been secretary-general of the secretariat. 
 
  Sources:  Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, ed., Zen saibankan 
keireki soran dai 4 ban [Overview of Careers of All Japanese Judges, 
4th ed.] (Tokyo:  Konin sha, 2004); Supreme Court of Japan, 
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/home.nsf/ehome?OpenPage.  
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Table 3:  Lower Court Judges Appointed in  
1968, 1978, 1988, and 1998:  Selected Stat istics 
 
A.  Number appointed --  
  Class of 1968:    86 (93% male) 
  Class of 1978:    82 (93% male) 
  Class of 1988:    79 (91% male) 
  Class of 1998:    94 (81% male) 
 
B.  % University of Tokyo graduates -- 
  Class of 1968:    29.1 
  Class of 1978:    17.1 
  Class of 1988:    20.3 
  Class of 1998:    17.0 
 
C.  % University of Kyoto graduates --  
  Class of 1968:    10.5 
  Class of 1978:    13.4 
  Class of 1988:     2.5 
  Class of 1998:     0 
 
D.  Mean times flunking the LRTI entrance exam --  
  Class of 1968:    4.4 
  Class of 1978:    4.6 
  Class of 1988:    4.9 
  Class of 1998:    3.5 
 
E.  % appointed initially to the Tokyo District Court --  
  Class of 1968:    18.8 
  Class of 1978:    19.2 
  Class of 1988:    31.5 
  Class of 1998:    30.1 
 
F.  % appointed initially to branch office or summary court  --  
  Class of 1968:    12.9 
  Class of 1978:     2.6 
  Class of 1988:     0 
  Class of 1998:     0 
 
G.  % members of the Young Jurists League --  
  Class of 1968:    11.6 
  Class of 1978:     0 
  Class of 1988:     0 
  Class of 1998:     0 
 
  Sources:  Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, ed., Zen saibankan 
keireki soran dai 4 ban [Overview of Careers of All Japanese Judges, 
4th ed.] (Tokyo:  Konin sha, 2004); We obtained the YJL roster from 
Shiso undo kenkyu sho, ed., Osorubeki saiban [Fearsome Trials] (Tokyo:  
Zenbo sha, 1969); Gakushikai, Kaiinshi meiroku:  Heisei 10 nen 
yo [Membership Roster:  For 1998 Use] (Tokyo:  Gakushikai, 
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Table 4:  Initial Appointment to the Tokyo District Court  
 
 
A.  Fraction of Class Starting at Tokyo District Court 
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
U Tokyo graduates  .30  .63 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .16    .23 
U Kyoto graduates  .23  * 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .18 
Flunks < 5  .24  .35 
   Flunks > 4    .10    .19 
Men  .20  .32 
   Women    .09    .24 
 
 
  Notes:  * No U Kyoto graduates in the class of 1998. 
  The pre-1993 column details the first postings of the classes of 1958, 1968, 
1978, and 1988; the post-1993 column details the first postings of the class of 
1998. 
 
B.  Determinants of Starting at the Tokyo District Court 
U Tokyo   .117**    Cl-98 * U Tokyo  .288   
  (1.91)          (1.54) 
U Kyoto
a   .022  
  (0.31) 
Flunks  -.034***   Cl-98 * Flunks  -.035  
  (3.17)             (1.48) 
Male  -.019    Cl-98 * Male   .226* 
  (0.23)           (1.73)   
        
 
n      424 
Adjusted R2  .04 
 
  Notes:  Dependent variable = 1 if initial appointment is to the Tokyo 
District Court. The regression is probit.  The table gives the marginal effects 
calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of z-statistic.  The 
adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * Significant at 
the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 
1 percent level.  Even for the classes of 1958 and 68, YJL membership did not 
affect initial appointments. 
 
a No U Kyoto graduates  were in the class of 1998. 
 
  Sources:  See Table 3. 
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Table 5:  Years 5-15 Appointments 
 
 
A.  Fraction of Years 5-15 in Administrative Posts  
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .28  .30 
   Non-TDC Starters     .06     .08 
U Tokyo graduates  .16  .20 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .08     .14 
U Kyoto graduates  .15  * 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .10 
Flunks < 5  .12  .23 
   Flunks > 4     .06     .06 
Non-YJL Members  .10  ** 
   YJL Members     .09 
Men  .11  .16 
   Women     .03     .10 
 
  Notes:  * Only 1 graduate.  ** No members in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1973-1983 
and the class of 1978 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of 
the class of 1988 during 1993-2003. 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 5-15 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts 
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .15  .19 
   Non-TDC Starters     .35     .28 
U Tokyo graduates  .24  .29 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .33     .24 
U Kyoto graduates  .27  * 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .31   
Flunks < 5  .27  .19 
   Flunks > 4     .39     .31 
Non-YJL Members  .30  ** 
   YJL Members     .35 
Men  .32  .25 
   Women     .19     .20 
 
  Notes:  * Only 1 graduate.  ** No members in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1973-1983 
and the class of 1978 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of 
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Table 5 (Cont'd) 
 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments 
YJL
a  -.026  
  (1.51) 
U Tokyo   .035     Cl-88 * U Tokyo   .009 
  (1.21)                (0.22)
U Kyoto  -.007     Cl-88 * U Kyoto   .622**
  (0.27)          (2.07)
Flunks  -.005     Cl-88 * Flunks  -.012 
  (1.44)          (1.64)
Male   .046***     Cl-88 * Male   .083 
  (2.70)          (1.23)
1
st TDC   .191***     Cl-88 * 1
st TDC  -.005 
              (3.49)          (0.14)
 
    n                239 
    Adjusted R2         .26 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 5-
15 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative post. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (179,58,2).  The table gives the 
marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-
statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * 
Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
a No members of the class of 1988 were members of the YJL. 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
YJL
a   .101* 
  (2.02) 
U Tokyo  -.048   Cl-88 * U Tokyo   .118  
  (1.13)        (1.39) 
U Kyoto  -.001   Cl-88 * U Kyoto  -.331***  
  (0.02)        (13.17) 
Flunks   .024***   Cl-88 * Flunks  .003  
  (5.51)        (0.35) 
Male   .142***   Cl-88 * Male  -.106*  
  (2.77)        (1.83) 
1
st TDC  -.165***   Cl-88 * 1
st TDC   .084 
  (4.21)        (1.03) 
 
    n                   239 
    Adjusted R2        .26 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 5-
15 of a judge’s career that he spends in a branch office or summary court. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (59,177,3).  The table gives the 
marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-
statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * 
Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
a No members of the class of 1988 were members of the YJL. 
 
  Sources:  See Table 3. 
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Table 6:  Years 15-25 Appointments 
 
 
A.  Fraction of Years 15-25 in Administrative Posts  
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .61  .62 
   Non-TDC Starters     .32     .27 
U Tokyo graduates  .44  .34 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .33     .32 
U Kyoto graduates  .56  .55 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .32     .29 
Flunks < 5  .40  .37 
   Flunks > 4    .26     .21 
Non-YJL Members  .38  * 
   YJL Members     .30 
Men  .37  .34 
   Women     .31     .08 
 
  Notes:  * No members in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1973-1983 
and the class of 1968 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of 
the class of 1978 during 1993-2003. 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 15-25 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts 
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .08  .04 
   Non-TDC Starters     .21     .27 
U Tokyo graduates  .11  .19 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .22     .22 
U Kyoto graduates  .07  .14 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .21     .23 
Flunks < 5  .16  .16 
   Flunks > 4     .27     .36 
Non-YJL Members  .18  * 
   YJL Members     .21 
Men  .19  .20 
   Women     .15     .44 
 
  Notes:  * No members in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1973-1983 
and the class of 1968 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of 
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Table 6 (Cont'd) 
 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments 
YJL
a  -.114**  
  (2.58) 
U Tokyo  .119*     Cl-78 * U Tokyo  -.072 
  (1.87)              (0.73)
U Kyoto  .237***     Cl-78 * U Kyoto  -.032 
  (3.14)          (0.27)
Flunks  -.003     Cl-78 * Flunks  -.031 
  (0.39)          (1.57)
Male  .197***     Cl-78 * Male  .055  
  (3.25)          (0.52)
1
st TDC  .210***     Cl-78 * 1
stTDC  .057  
  (2.84)          (0.46)
 
    n             218 
    Adjusted R2          .21 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 
15-25 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative post. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (68,143,7).  The table gives the 
marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-
statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * 
Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
significant at the 1 percent level.   
 
a No members of the class of 1978 were members of the YJL. 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
YJL
a  .056  
  (1.07) 
U Tokyo  -.097***     Cl-78 * U Tokyo  .065  
  (2.14)          (0.52)
U Kyoto  -.145***     Cl-78 * U Kyoto  .173 
  (3.24)          (1.00)
Flunks  .011    Cl-78 * Flunks    .028* 
  (1.53)          (1.73)
Male  .015    Cl-78 * Male    -.091 
  (0.21)          (1.36)
1
st TDC  -.110**     Cl-78 * 1
st TDC  -.139* 
  (2.16)          (1.84)
 
    n             218 
    Adjusted R2          .13 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 
15-25 of a judge’s career that he spends in branch offices or summary courts. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (116,100,2).  The table gives the 
marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-
statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * 
Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
significant at the 1 percent level.   
 
a No members of the class of 1978 were members of the YJL. 
 
  Sources:  See Table 3. Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 39 
Table 7:  Years 25-35 Appointments 
 
 
A.  Fraction of Years 25-35 in Administrative Posts  
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .63  .79 
   Non-TDC Starters     .63     .49 
U Tokyo graduates  .60  .61 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .65     .55 
U Kyoto graduates  .60  .85 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .65     .53 
Flunks < 5  .65  .63 
   Flunks > 4     .58     .37 
Non-YJL Members  .69  .60 
   YJL Members     .50     .48 
Men  *  .57 
   Women       .48 
 
  Notes:  * Only two women in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1983-
1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1993-
2003. 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 25-35 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts 
 
  Pre-1993  Post-1993 
TDC Starters  .08  .02 
   Non-TDC Starters     .06     .19 
U Tokyo graduates  .05  .09 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates     .06     .17 
U Kyoto graduates  .07  .04 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates     .06     .16 
Flunks < 5  .06  .14 
   Flunks > 4     .04     .16 
Non-YJL Members  .04  .12 
   YJL Members     .10     .20 
Men  *  .14 
   Women       .19 
 
  Notes:  * Only two women in this age bracket. 
  The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1983-
1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1993-
2003. 
 Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 40 
Table 7 (Cont'd) 
 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments 
YJL  -.175*    Cl-68 * YJL   .028  
  (1.78)          (0.22)
U Tokyo  -.086     Cl-68 * U Tokyo  .104  
  (0.62)          (0.69)
U Kyoto  -.124     Cl-68 * U Kyoto  .283**
  (1.11)          (2.21)
Flunks  -.027     Cl-68 * Flunks  -.012 
  (1.16)          (0.47)
Male   .298**     Cl-68 * Male  -.153 
  (2.10)           (1.20)
1
st TDC  -.028     Cl-68 * 1
st TDC  .178  
  (0.15)          (1.05)
 
    n              134 
    Adjusted R2           .14 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 25-
of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative post. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (17,84,33).  The table gives the marginal 
effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-statistic. The 
adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * Significant at the 
10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 
percent level. 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
YJL  .102    Cl-68 * YJL   -.000  
  (0.86)        (0.00) 
U Tokyo  -.064   Cl-68 * U Tokyo  -.017  
  (0.61)        (0.11) 
U Kyoto  -.001   Cl-68 * U Kyoto  -.088  
  (0.01)        (0.69) 
Flunks  -.001   Cl-68 * Flunks  .002  
  (0.07)        (0.07) 
Male  -.296   Cl-68 * Male  .141  
  (1.37)        (1.50) 
1
st TDC  .092    Cl-68 * 1
st TDC  -.170**  
  (0.44)        (1.96) 
   
    n              134 
    Adjusted R2          .10 
 
  Notes:  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 
25-35 of a judge’s career that he spends in branch offices or summary courts. 
  The regression is tobit.  Censoring: (98,35,1).  The table gives the marginal 
effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of t-statistic.  
The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.  * Significant 
at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
 
  Sources:  See Table 3. 
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Table 8:  The Alternating Parties Theory 
 
 
                                                          Opposition 
 
              Managed Judges                                (10,0) 
 
 
Incumbent    Independent and Unbiased Judges                 (8,6) 
 
 
             Independent but Biased Judges                  (5, 5) 
 
          
 
  